State of Madhya Pradesh v. Jogendra

Criminal Appeal No. 190 of 2012, decided 11 January 2022 (no reporter citation on the official copy)

Court: Supreme Court of India (Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction)
Case: Criminal Appeal No. 190 of 2012
Decided: 11 January 2022
Bench: N.V. Ramana (CJI), A.S. Bopanna, Hima Kohli (judgment by Hima Kohli, J.)
Citation: Criminal Appeal No. 190 of 2012, decided 11 January 2022 (no reporter citation on the official copy)
Provisions: Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 304B (now Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, s. 80) read with Indian Evidence Act, 1872, s. 113B (now Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023) and Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, s. 2

Headnote

Dowry death · IPC s. 304B (BNS s. 80) · Evidence Act s. 113B presumption (now BSA) · Meaning of dowry · Soon before her death · Demand for money to build a house

The case, in the Court's words

The present appeal has been preferred by the State of Madhya Pradesh, being aggrieved by the judgment dated 10th September, 2008 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, whereby the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 17th December, 2003 imposed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge [para 1]

Held

The most fundamental constituent for attracting the provisions of Section 304-B IPC is that the death of the woman must be a dowry death. The ingredients for making out an offence under Section 304-B have been reiterated in several rulings of this Court. Four pre-requisites for convicting an accused for the offence punishable under Section 304-B are as follows: (i) that the death of a woman must have been caused by burns or bodily injury or occurred otherwise than under normal circumstance; (ii) that such a death must have occurred within a period of seven years of her marriage; (iii) that the woman must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment at the hands of her husband, soon before her death; and (iv) that such a cruelty or harassment must have been for or related to any demand for dowry. [para 9]
In the light of the above provision that defines the word “dowry” and takes in its ambit any kind of property or valuable security, in our opinion, the High Court fell into an error by holding that the demand of money for construction of a house cannot be treated as a dowry demand. [para 12]
Interpretation of a provision of law that will defeat the very intention of the legislature must be shunned in favour of an interpretation that will promote the object sought to be achieved through the legislation meant to uproot a social evil like dowry demand. In this context the word “Dowry” ought to be ascribed an expansive meaning so as to encompass [...] any demand made on a woman, whether in respect of a property or a valuable security of any nature. [para 13]
it has been emphasized that “soon before” is not synonymous to “immediately before” and the following observations have been made: “24. We endorse what has been said by these two decisions. Days or months are not what is to be seen. What must be borne in mind is that the word “soon” does not mean “immediate”. A fair and pragmatic construction keeping in mind the great social evil that has led to the enactment of Section 304-B would make it clear that the expression is a relative expression. Time-lags may differ from case to case. All that is necessary is that the demand for dowry should not be stale but should be the continuing cause for the death of the married woman under Section 304-B.” [para 16]
38.2. The prosecution must at first establish the existence of the necessary ingredients for constituting an offence under Section 304-B IPC. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the rebuttable presumption of causality, provided under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act operates against the accused. 38.3. The phrase “soon before” as appearing in Section 304- B IPC cannot be construed to mean “immediately before”. [...] The prosecution must establish existence of “proximate and live link” between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment for dowry demand by the husband or his relatives. [para 17]

Result

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court in respect of both the respondents under Section 304-B and Section 498-A IPC, is restored. However, the sentence imposed on them by the trial Court of RI for life is reduced to RI for seven years, which is the minimum sentence prescribed for an offence under Section 304-B IPC. [para 20]

Editorial note: subsequent treatment

A three-Judge Bench. It follows Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2015) 6 SCC 477 on the meaning of dowry (paras 11 and 12) and on soon before her death (para 16). In para 17 it reproduces, as 'a recent decision of a three Judge Bench', the summary at para 38 of Gurmeet Singh v. State of Punjab (2021) 6 SCC 108, which restates the guidelines in Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana (2021) 6 SCC 1 (held 5 is that quoted passage). The Court left undisturbed the High Court's acquittal under s. 306 IPC (para 20).

The headnote consists of extracts from the Court's judgment, selected by The Daily Bench for convenience. The selection is not part of the judgment, is not a law report and should not be cited. It may contain errors; rely on the official judgment. Library reference TDB-LL BNS-80/03 is our own cataloguing label and is not a citation.