Section 80 carries forward IPC s. 304B; the presumption is now in the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023.
Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab
- Case
- Criminal Appeal No. 2321 of 2009
- Bench
- T.S. Thakur, R.F. Nariman, Prafulla C. Pant (judgment by R.F. Nariman, J.)
- Provisions
- Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 304B (now Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, s. 80) read with Indian Evidence Act, 1872, s. 113B (now Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023) and Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, s. 2
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Headnote
Dowry death · IPC s. 304B (BNS s. 80) · Evidence Act s. 113B presumption (now BSA) · Meaning of dowry (Dowry Prohibition Act s. 2) · Meaning of soon before her death
The case, in the Court's words
Coming back to the facts of the present appeal, a young woman, namely, Salwinder Kaur was married to the appellant Rajinder Singh sometime in the year 1990. On 31st August, 1993, within four years of the marriage, Salwinder Kaur consumed Aluminium Phosphide, which is a pesticide, as a result of which her young life was snuffed out. [para 3]
Held
- The ingredients of the offence under Section 304B have been stated and restated in many judgments. There are four such ingredients and they are said to be: (a) death of a woman must have been caused by any burns or bodily injury or her death must have occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances; (b) such death must have occurred within seven years of her marriage; (c) soon before her death, she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband; and (d) such cruelty or harassment must be in connection with the demand for dowry. [para 9]
- Given that the statute with which we are dealing must be given a fair, pragmatic, and common sense interpretation so as to fulfill the object sought to be achieved by Parliament, we feel that the judgment in Appasaheb’s case followed by the judgment of Vipin Jaiswal do not state the law correctly. We, therefore, declare that any money or property or valuable security demanded by any of the persons mentioned in Section [...] 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, at or before or at any time after the marriage which is reasonably connected to the death of a married woman, would necessarily be in connection with or in relation to the marriage unless, the facts of a given case clearly and unequivocally point otherwise. [para 20]
- Days or months are not what is to be seen. What must be borne in mind is that the word “soon” does not mean “immediate”. A fair and pragmatic construction keeping in mind the great social evil that has led to the enactment of Section 304B would make it clear that the expression is a relative expression. Time lags may differ from case to case. All that is necessary is that the demand for dowry should not be stale but should be the continuing cause for the death of the married woman under Section 304B. [para 23]
- We hasten to add that this is not a correct reflection of the law. “Soon before” is not synonymous with “immediately before”. [para 25]
Result
On the facts, therefore, the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below are upheld. The appeal is dismissed. [para 26]
Editorial note: subsequent treatment
A three-Judge Bench. Quoted and followed on the meaning of dowry and of soon before her death in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Jogendra (2022). In para 20 the Court held that Appasaheb v. State of Maharashtra (2007) and Vipin Jaiswal v. State of A.P. (2013) do not state the law correctly, and in para 25 it said that a passage in Dinesh v. State of Haryana (2014) equating soon before with immediately before was not a correct reflection of the law.
Mahesh Kumar v. State of Haryana
- Case
- Criminal Appeal No. 1042 of 2012
- Bench
- L. Nageswara Rao, Hemant Gupta (judgment by Hemant Gupta, J.)
- Provisions
- Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 304B (now Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, s. 80) read with Indian Evidence Act, 1872, s. 113B (now Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023)
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Headnote
Dowry death · IPC s. 304B (BNS s. 80) · Evidence Act s. 113B presumption (now BSA) · Soon before her death · Proximate and live link
The case, in the Court's words
This appeal has been preferred against the judgment dated 21.01.2009, passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, by which the High Court has [...] affirmed the conviction of the appellant passed by trial court on 12.12.1995 for the offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC. [para 1]
Held
- The first and foremost question that arises in this case, and in respect of the necessary ingredients of Section 304-B IPC, is whether there is a proximate nexus between the death of the deceased with the cruelty or harassment inflicted upon her in respect of the demand of dowry. [para 9]
- It is not enough that harassment or cruelty was caused to the woman with a demand for dowry at some time, if Section 304-B is to be invoked. But it should have happened “soon before her death”. The said phrase, no doubt, is an elastic expression and can refer to a period either immediately before her death or within a few days or even a few weeks before it. But the proximity to her death is the pivot indicated by that expression. [para 10]
- A conjoint reading of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC shows that there must be material to show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. The prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of “death occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances”. [para 11]
- The prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and only in that case presumption operates. Evidence in that regard has to be led by the prosecution. [...] There must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence. [para 11]
- In view of the judgments referred to above, the prosecution has failed to prove either the demand of dowry or that any such demand was raised soon before her death. Therefore, the essential ingredients of offence under Section 304-B of IPC are not proved by the prosecution. The prosecution has even failed to prove the initial presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. [para 16]
Result
Consequently, we allow the present appeal and set aside the conviction of the appellant and set him at liberty as long as he is not involved in any other case. [para 17]
Editorial note: subsequent treatment
Applies and quotes, on soon before her death, Satvir Singh v. State of Punjab (2001) 8 SCC 633 and Hira Lal v. State (Govt. of NCT), Delhi (2003) 8 SCC 80 (paras 10 and 11). The passages in held 2 to 4 are the Court's own quotations from those two judgments.
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Jogendra
- Case
- Criminal Appeal No. 190 of 2012
- Bench
- N.V. Ramana (CJI), A.S. Bopanna, Hima Kohli (judgment by Hima Kohli, J.)
- Provisions
- Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 304B (now Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, s. 80) read with Indian Evidence Act, 1872, s. 113B (now Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023) and Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, s. 2
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Headnote
Dowry death · IPC s. 304B (BNS s. 80) · Evidence Act s. 113B presumption (now BSA) · Meaning of dowry · Soon before her death · Demand for money to build a house
The case, in the Court's words
The present appeal has been preferred by the State of Madhya Pradesh, being aggrieved by the judgment dated 10th September, 2008 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, whereby the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 17th December, 2003 imposed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge [para 1]
Held
- The most fundamental constituent for attracting the provisions of Section 304-B IPC is that the death of the woman must be a dowry death. The ingredients for making out an offence under Section 304-B have been reiterated in several rulings of this Court. Four pre-requisites for convicting an accused for the offence punishable under Section 304-B are as follows: (i) that the death of a woman must have been caused by burns or bodily injury or occurred otherwise than under normal circumstance; (ii) that such a death must have occurred within a period of seven years of her marriage; (iii) that the woman must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment at the hands of her husband, soon before her death; and (iv) that such a cruelty or harassment must have been for or related to any demand for dowry. [para 9]
- In the light of the above provision that defines the word “dowry” and takes in its ambit any kind of property or valuable security, in our opinion, the High Court fell into an error by holding that the demand of money for construction of a house cannot be treated as a dowry demand. [para 12]
- Interpretation of a provision of law that will defeat the very intention of the legislature must be shunned in favour of an interpretation that will promote the object sought to be achieved through the legislation meant to uproot a social evil like dowry demand. In this context the word “Dowry” ought to be ascribed an expansive meaning so as to encompass [...] any demand made on a woman, whether in respect of a property or a valuable security of any nature. [para 13]
- it has been emphasized that “soon before” is not synonymous to “immediately before” and the following observations have been made: “24. We endorse what has been said by these two decisions. Days or months are not what is to be seen. What must be borne in mind is that the word “soon” does not mean “immediate”. A fair and pragmatic construction keeping in mind the great social evil that has led to the enactment of Section 304-B would make it clear that the expression is a relative expression. Time-lags may differ from case to case. All that is necessary is that the demand for dowry should not be stale but should be the continuing cause for the death of the married woman under Section 304-B.” [para 16]
- 38.2. The prosecution must at first establish the existence of the necessary ingredients for constituting an offence under Section 304-B IPC. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the rebuttable presumption of causality, provided under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act operates against the accused. 38.3. The phrase “soon before” as appearing in Section 304- B IPC cannot be construed to mean “immediately before”. [...] The prosecution must establish existence of “proximate and live link” between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment for dowry demand by the husband or his relatives. [para 17]
Result
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court in respect of both the respondents under Section 304-B and Section 498-A IPC, is restored. However, the sentence imposed on them by the trial Court of RI for life is reduced to RI for seven years, which is the minimum sentence prescribed for an offence under Section 304-B IPC. [para 20]
Editorial note: subsequent treatment
A three-Judge Bench. It follows Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2015) 6 SCC 477 on the meaning of dowry (paras 11 and 12) and on soon before her death (para 16). In para 17 it reproduces, as 'a recent decision of a three Judge Bench', the summary at para 38 of Gurmeet Singh v. State of Punjab (2021) 6 SCC 108, which restates the guidelines in Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana (2021) 6 SCC 1 (held 5 is that quoted passage). The Court left undisturbed the High Court's acquittal under s. 306 IPC (para 20).
Paranagouda v. State of Karnataka
- Case
- Criminal Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 12216 of 2022
- Bench
- S. Ravindra Bhat, Aravind Kumar (judgment by Aravind Kumar, J.)
- Provisions
- Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 304B (now Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, s. 80) read with Indian Evidence Act, 1872, s. 113B (now Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023); IPC s. 498A (BNS s. 85) and s. 306 (BNS s. 108)
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Headnote
Dowry death · IPC s. 304B (BNS s. 80) · Live link with the dowry demand · Conviction under s. 306 and s. 498A when s. 304B fails
The case, in the Court's words
The third daughter of the complainant (Shri Chandappa Gooli) named Akkamahadevi was married to second respondent/accused No.1 herein on 16.05.2010. [para 3]
Held
- The incidental question that would also arise for our consideration is: whether the conviction of the accused under Section 304B would be sustainable? The ingredients to be satisfied for convicting an accused for the offence punishable under Section 304B are: “(i) The death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under a normal circumstance. (ii) Such a death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage. (iii) She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband. (iv) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry. (v) Such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the woman soon before her death.” [para 14]
- Therefore, in case the essential ingredients of such death have been established by the prosecution, it is the duty of the court to raise a presumption that the accused has caused the dowry death. It may also be pertinent to mention herein that the expression “soon before her death” has not been defined in either of the statutes. Therefore, in each case, the Court has to analyse the facts and circumstances leading to the death of the victim and decide if there is any proximate connection between the demand of dowry and act of cruelty or harassment and the death. [para 15]
- In other words, it is for the prosecution to prove that a “dowry death” has occurred, namely, (i) that the death of a woman has been caused in abnormal circumstances by her having been burned or having been bodily injured, (ii) within seven years of her marriage, (iii) and that she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband, (iv) in connection with any demand for dowry, and (v) that the cruelty or harassment meted out to her continued to have a causal connection or a live link with the demand of dowry. [para 16]
- We are aware that the word “soon” finds place in Section 304-B; but we would prefer to interpret its use not in terms of days or months or years, but as necessarily indicating that the demand for dowry should not be stale or an aberration of the past, but should be the continuing cause for the death under Section 304-B or the suicide under Section 306 IPC. [para 16]
- This proximate link not being available in the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that conviction of the accused under Section 304B cannot be sustained. [para 17]
- Irrespective of the fact that accused have been acquitted for the offence punishable under Section 304B, Section 498A would cover the cases in which the wife is subjected to cruelty by husband or relatives of the husband which may result in death by way of suicide or cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical). [para 21]
Result
The appellants are acquitted for the offences punishable under Section 304B IPC and Section 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and convicted for the offence punishable under Section 306 and Section 498A read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for the period already undergone [para 30]
Editorial note: subsequent treatment
Relies on Sher Singh alias Partapa v. State of Haryana (2015) (held 3 and 4 are the Court's quotation of it), Bansilal v. State of Haryana (2011) 11 SCC 359 and Dinesh Seth v. State of NCT of Delhi (2008) 14 SCC 94 (s. 304B and s. 498A have different scope). Held 3 and 4 are quoted passages; held 2 is a quotation from Bansilal.
State of U.P. v. Ajmal Beg
- Case
- Criminal Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017
- Bench
- Sanjay Karol, Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh (judgment by Sanjay Karol, J.)
- Provisions
- Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 304B (now Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, s. 80) read with Indian Evidence Act, 1872, s. 113B (now Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023) and Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, s. 2
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Headnote
Dowry death · IPC s. 304B (BNS s. 80) · Evidence Act s. 113B presumption (now BSA) · Soon before her death · Meaning of dowry · Appeal against acquittal
The case, in the Court's words
These appeals are at the instance of the State of Uttar Pradesh, laying challenge to a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad [...] entering a finding of acquittal of the respondents herein, setting aside the judgment and order dated 7th October 2003, of conviction returned by the Additional Sessions Judge, Bijnor [para 1]
Held
- In our view, the expression “soon before her death” cannot be given a restricted or a narrower meaning. They must be understood in their plain language and with reference to their meaning in common parlance. [...] We are of the considered view that the concept of reasonable time is the best criteria to be applied for appreciation and examination of such cases. [...] In other words, there should be a reasonable, if not direct, nexus between her death and the dowry-related cruelty or harassment inflicted on her. [para 14]
- read along with Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872 makes it clear that once the prosecution has succeeded in demonstrating that a woman has been subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand for dowry soon before her death, a presumption shall be drawn against the said persons that they have caused dowry death as contemplated under Section [...] The said presumption comes with a rider inasmuch as this presumption can be rebutted by the accused on demonstrating during the trial that all the ingredients of Section [...] have not been satisfied. [para 14]
- The expression “soon before her death”, as explained in Ashok Kumar (supra) would, in the considered view of this Court, be met and all the essentials, as noted in Pavan Kumar (supra) would be satisfied. Here itself, it may then be noted that the presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 came into effect as soon as it stood proved that the deceased had been subjected to cruelty soon before her death, and went unrebutted by the defence, since no evidence was led by them. [para 20]
- When the harassment for dowry is proved and so is the fact that such harassment was made soon before her death, then a mere statement of one of the witnesses that she was apparently happy, would not save the Respondents from guilt. [para 22]
- It is clear from the above that any property or valuable security given by either party to a marriage to the other, or by any other person to the party to marriage, or to any other person, on the day of marriage, before or at any time after marriage, shall be considered to be dowry. [para 23]
Result
The State’s appeals, therefore, deserve to be allowed. The judgment of the Trial Court, insofar as it relates to the conviction of both Ajmal and Jamila, is restored, as also the [...] quantum of sentence in respect of Ajmal is concerned. [para 24]
Editorial note: subsequent treatment
A December 2025 judgment setting aside a High Court acquittal. It applies Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana (2010) 12 SCC 350 and Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana (1998) 3 SCC 309, and quotes the three-Judge Bench judgment in Devender Singh v. State of Uttarakhand (2022) 13 SCC 82 on the presumption (held 2 is that quoted passage). It also issues directions on awareness and expeditious disposal of dowry cases (para 26).
Headnotes are extracts from the Court's own judgments, selected by The Daily Bench for convenience. The selection is not part of the judgments, is not a law report and should not be cited. Rely on the official judgment.