Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab

(2015) 6 SCC 477

Court: Supreme Court of India (Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction)
Case: Criminal Appeal No. 2321 of 2009
Decided: 26 February 2015
Bench: T.S. Thakur, R.F. Nariman, Prafulla C. Pant (judgment by R.F. Nariman, J.)
Citation: (2015) 6 SCC 477
Provisions: Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 304B (now Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, s. 80) read with Indian Evidence Act, 1872, s. 113B (now Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023) and Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, s. 2

Headnote

Dowry death · IPC s. 304B (BNS s. 80) · Evidence Act s. 113B presumption (now BSA) · Meaning of dowry (Dowry Prohibition Act s. 2) · Meaning of soon before her death

The case, in the Court's words

Coming back to the facts of the present appeal, a young woman, namely, Salwinder Kaur was married to the appellant Rajinder Singh sometime in the year 1990. On 31st August, 1993, within four years of the marriage, Salwinder Kaur consumed Aluminium Phosphide, which is a pesticide, as a result of which her young life was snuffed out. [para 3]

Held

The ingredients of the offence under Section 304B have been stated and restated in many judgments. There are four such ingredients and they are said to be: (a) death of a woman must have been caused by any burns or bodily injury or her death must have occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances; (b) such death must have occurred within seven years of her marriage; (c) soon before her death, she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband; and (d) such cruelty or harassment must be in connection with the demand for dowry. [para 9]
Given that the statute with which we are dealing must be given a fair, pragmatic, and common sense interpretation so as to fulfill the object sought to be achieved by Parliament, we feel that the judgment in Appasaheb’s case followed by the judgment of Vipin Jaiswal do not state the law correctly. We, therefore, declare that any money or property or valuable security demanded by any of the persons mentioned in Section [...] 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, at or before or at any time after the marriage which is reasonably connected to the death of a married woman, would necessarily be in connection with or in relation to the marriage unless, the facts of a given case clearly and unequivocally point otherwise. [para 20]
Days or months are not what is to be seen. What must be borne in mind is that the word “soon” does not mean “immediate”. A fair and pragmatic construction keeping in mind the great social evil that has led to the enactment of Section 304B would make it clear that the expression is a relative expression. Time lags may differ from case to case. All that is necessary is that the demand for dowry should not be stale but should be the continuing cause for the death of the married woman under Section 304B. [para 23]
We hasten to add that this is not a correct reflection of the law. “Soon before” is not synonymous with “immediately before”. [para 25]

Result

On the facts, therefore, the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below are upheld. The appeal is dismissed. [para 26]

Editorial note: subsequent treatment

A three-Judge Bench. Quoted and followed on the meaning of dowry and of soon before her death in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Jogendra (2022). In para 20 the Court held that Appasaheb v. State of Maharashtra (2007) and Vipin Jaiswal v. State of A.P. (2013) do not state the law correctly, and in para 25 it said that a passage in Dinesh v. State of Haryana (2014) equating soon before with immediately before was not a correct reflection of the law.

The headnote consists of extracts from the Court's judgment, selected by The Daily Bench for convenience. The selection is not part of the judgment, is not a law report and should not be cited. It may contain errors; rely on the official judgment. Library reference TDB-LL BNS-80/01 is our own cataloguing label and is not a citation.