Paranagouda v. State of Karnataka

2023 INSC 933

Court: Supreme Court of India (Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction)
Case: Criminal Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 12216 of 2022
Decided: 19 October 2023
Bench: S. Ravindra Bhat, Aravind Kumar (judgment by Aravind Kumar, J.)
Citation: 2023 INSC 933
Provisions: Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 304B (now Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, s. 80) read with Indian Evidence Act, 1872, s. 113B (now Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023); IPC s. 498A (BNS s. 85) and s. 306 (BNS s. 108)

Headnote

Dowry death · IPC s. 304B (BNS s. 80) · Live link with the dowry demand · Conviction under s. 306 and s. 498A when s. 304B fails

The case, in the Court's words

The third daughter of the complainant (Shri Chandappa Gooli) named Akkamahadevi was married to second respondent/accused No.1 herein on 16.05.2010. [para 3]

Held

The incidental question that would also arise for our consideration is: whether the conviction of the accused under Section 304B would be sustainable? The ingredients to be satisfied for convicting an accused for the offence punishable under Section 304B are: “(i) The death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under a normal circumstance. (ii) Such a death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage. (iii) She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband. (iv) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry. (v) Such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the woman soon before her death.” [para 14]
Therefore, in case the essential ingredients of such death have been established by the prosecution, it is the duty of the court to raise a presumption that the accused has caused the dowry death. It may also be pertinent to mention herein that the expression “soon before her death” has not been defined in either of the statutes. Therefore, in each case, the Court has to analyse the facts and circumstances leading to the death of the victim and decide if there is any proximate connection between the demand of dowry and act of cruelty or harassment and the death. [para 15]
In other words, it is for the prosecution to prove that a “dowry death” has occurred, namely, (i) that the death of a woman has been caused in abnormal circumstances by her having been burned or having been bodily injured, (ii) within seven years of her marriage, (iii) and that she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband, (iv) in connection with any demand for dowry, and (v) that the cruelty or harassment meted out to her continued to have a causal connection or a live link with the demand of dowry. [para 16]
We are aware that the word “soon” finds place in Section 304-B; but we would prefer to interpret its use not in terms of days or months or years, but as necessarily indicating that the demand for dowry should not be stale or an aberration of the past, but should be the continuing cause for the death under Section 304-B or the suicide under Section 306 IPC. [para 16]
This proximate link not being available in the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that conviction of the accused under Section 304B cannot be sustained. [para 17]
Irrespective of the fact that accused have been acquitted for the offence punishable under Section 304B, Section 498A would cover the cases in which the wife is subjected to cruelty by husband or relatives of the husband which may result in death by way of suicide or cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical). [para 21]

Result

The appellants are acquitted for the offences punishable under Section 304B IPC and Section 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and convicted for the offence punishable under Section 306 and Section 498A read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for the period already undergone [para 30]

Editorial note: subsequent treatment

Relies on Sher Singh alias Partapa v. State of Haryana (2015) (held 3 and 4 are the Court's quotation of it), Bansilal v. State of Haryana (2011) 11 SCC 359 and Dinesh Seth v. State of NCT of Delhi (2008) 14 SCC 94 (s. 304B and s. 498A have different scope). Held 3 and 4 are quoted passages; held 2 is a quotation from Bansilal.

The headnote consists of extracts from the Court's judgment, selected by The Daily Bench for convenience. The selection is not part of the judgment, is not a law report and should not be cited. It may contain errors; rely on the official judgment. Library reference TDB-LL BNS-80/04 is our own cataloguing label and is not a citation.