Mahesh Kumar v. State of Haryana

Criminal Appeal No. 1042 of 2012, decided 7 August 2019 (no reporter citation on the official copy)

Court: Supreme Court of India (Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction)
Case: Criminal Appeal No. 1042 of 2012
Decided: 7 August 2019
Bench: L. Nageswara Rao, Hemant Gupta (judgment by Hemant Gupta, J.)
Citation: Criminal Appeal No. 1042 of 2012, decided 7 August 2019 (no reporter citation on the official copy)
Provisions: Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 304B (now Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, s. 80) read with Indian Evidence Act, 1872, s. 113B (now Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023)

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Headnote

Dowry death · IPC s. 304B (BNS s. 80) · Evidence Act s. 113B presumption (now BSA) · Soon before her death · Proximate and live link

The case, in the Court's words

This appeal has been preferred against the judgment dated 21.01.2009, passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, by which the High Court has [...] affirmed the conviction of the appellant passed by trial court on 12.12.1995 for the offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC. [para 1]

Held

The first and foremost question that arises in this case, and in respect of the necessary ingredients of Section 304-B IPC, is whether there is a proximate nexus between the death of the deceased with the cruelty or harassment inflicted upon her in respect of the demand of dowry. [para 9]
It is not enough that harassment or cruelty was caused to the woman with a demand for dowry at some time, if Section 304-B is to be invoked. But it should have happened “soon before her death”. The said phrase, no doubt, is an elastic expression and can refer to a period either immediately before her death or within a few days or even a few weeks before it. But the proximity to her death is the pivot indicated by that expression. [para 10]
A conjoint reading of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC shows that there must be material to show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. The prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of “death occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances”. [para 11]
The prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and only in that case presumption operates. Evidence in that regard has to be led by the prosecution. [...] There must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence. [para 11]
In view of the judgments referred to above, the prosecution has failed to prove either the demand of dowry or that any such demand was raised soon before her death. Therefore, the essential ingredients of offence under Section 304-B of IPC are not proved by the prosecution. The prosecution has even failed to prove the initial presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. [para 16]

Result

Consequently, we allow the present appeal and set aside the conviction of the appellant and set him at liberty as long as he is not involved in any other case. [para 17]

Editorial note: subsequent treatment

Applies and quotes, on soon before her death, Satvir Singh v. State of Punjab (2001) 8 SCC 633 and Hira Lal v. State (Govt. of NCT), Delhi (2003) 8 SCC 80 (paras 10 and 11). The passages in held 2 to 4 are the Court's own quotations from those two judgments.

The headnote consists of extracts from the Court's judgment, selected by The Daily Bench for convenience. The selection is not part of the judgment, is not a law report and should not be cited. It may contain errors; rely on the official judgment. Library reference TDB-LL BNS-80/02 is our own cataloguing label and is not a citation.