Dr. Lokesh B.H. v. State of Karnataka

2026 INSC 784

Court: Supreme Court of India (Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction)
Case: Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 2240-2241 of 2026 (number blank in the official copy)
Decided: 3 August 2026
Bench: Sanjay Karol, Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh (judgment by Sanjay Karol, J.)
Citation: 2026 INSC 784
Provisions: Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 498A (now Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, s. 85)
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, s. 482 (now Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, s. 528)

Headnote

IPC s. 498A (BNS s. 85) · Meaning of 'husband': relationship in the nature of marriage · Live-in relationship and cruelty · Purposive interpretation of a penal provision · Arnesh Kumar safeguards

The case, in the Court's words

The allegation in the FIR is that the appellant had suppressed the factum of his prior marriage, he, along with his family members, had harassed respondent no.2 for dowry and also caused physical injury to her [para 22]

Held

Adding force and life to the cure in accordance with the true intent and accounting for a social change as an aspect for adjudication, would then lead us to the conclusion that if a woman is in a domestic setup even prior to marriage, which obviously, to a certain extent in the urban areas is a reality today, the protection [...] given to married woman should be given to them also. [para 21]
It is held, therefore, that a woman in a “relationship in the nature of marriage” shall be protected under Section 498A, giving the word “husband” a purposive interpretation, keeping in view the reformative, corrective and socially beneficial intent of the Section. [para 21]
Those relationships that are in the nature of marriage and also have the requisite intent to marry are the closest to marriage itself, and it is those relationships that shall be entitled to the protection of this Section. [...] The presence of the intent of the parties shall obviously lie upon the person alleging that the intent was present. In other words, the initial burden of proof would be on the female live-in-partner seeking protection of the law. [para 21]
In view of the above discussion, the application of the section is restricted, keeping in view its penal nature and also a long list of adverse consequences which may accompany such a strict provision. Even with this limited application, the other protections that have been judicially developed against the misuse of this provision should apply to these cases also. [para 21]
(i) Section 498A is held to be applicable to “live-in relationships” that qualify as “relationships in the nature of marriage” with the intent to marry being established as an intrinsic part thereof; (ii) The “live-in relationships” protected by Section 498A, it is stated for ample clarity, are those that are between two consenting adult individuals; (iii) The proposition of law as laid down shall be limited to Section 498A IPC only, and this extended interpretation shall not affect any other provision; [para 23]
The safeguards against arrest and other factors as laid down in Arnesh Kumar supra shall be strictly applied and no person in a relationship in the nature of marriage having been accused of committing cruelty against a woman, being either the live-in partner “in the nature of marriage” or his relative, shall be arrested without preliminary enquiries. [para 23]

Result

This is not a fit case for the proceedings to be quashed. The Trial Court shall be at liberty to proceed in accordance with law. [para 24]

Editorial note: subsequent treatment

The Bench discusses Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam (2004), notes that a three-Judge Bench approved it in Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2015), states that the three-Judge order in Shivcharan Lal Verma v. State of M.P. does not lay down a binding precedent on section 498A, and holds that the ingredients listed in U. Suvetha v. State (2009) must give way to a purposive interpretation. It applies the Arnesh Kumar safeguards.

The headnote consists of extracts from the Court's judgment, selected by The Daily Bench for convenience. The selection is not part of the judgment, is not a law report and should not be cited. It may contain errors; rely on the official judgment. Library reference TDB-LL BNS-85-86/04 is our own cataloguing label and is not a citation.