Uday v. State of Karnataka

[2003] 2 SCR 231

Court: Supreme Court of India (Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction)
Case: Criminal Appeal No. 336 of 1996
Decided: 19 February 2003
Bench: N. Santosh Hegde, B.P. Singh (judgment by B.P. Singh, J.)
Citation: [2003] 2 SCR 231
Provisions: IPC s. 375 (rape; Secondly: without her consent) = BNS s. 63(ii)
IPC s. 90 (consent given under fear or misconception) = BNS s. 28(a)
BNS s. 69 (sexual intercourse by deceitful means or by a promise to marry without any intention of fulfilling it, not amounting to rape; up to 10 years and fine; no IPC equivalent)

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Headnote

Sensitive matter. Sexual-offence matter (rape alleged on a promise of marriage). The complainant is not named anywhere in this file, and her name is omitted from every extract.

Rape · Consent obtained on a promise to marry · Misconception of fact · IPC s. 90 (BNS s. 28) · IPC s. 375 Secondly (BNS s. 63(ii))

The case, in the Court's words

The trial court as well as the High Court have concurrently held that though the prosecutrix [...] had consented to sexual intercourse with the appellant, the consent was obtained by fraud and deception inasmuch as the appellant induced her to consent on the promise that he shall marry her. [SCR p. 234]

Held

It therefore appears that the consensus of judicial opinion is in favour [...] of the view that the consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a person with whom she is deeply in love on a promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be said to be given under a misconception of fact. A false promise is not a misconception of fact [...] the meaning of the Code. [SCR p. 243]
In the ultimate analysis, the tests laid down by the Courts provide at best guidance to the judicial mind while considering a question of consent, but the Court must, in each case, consider the evidence before it and the surrounding circumstances, before reaching a conclusion, [...] because each case has its own peculiar facts which may have a bearing on the question whether the consent was voluntary, or was given under a misconception of fact. It must also weigh the evidence keeping in view the fact that the burden is on the prosecution to prove each and every ingredient of the offence, absence of consent being one of them. [SCR p. 243]
In a case of this nature two conditions must be fulfilled for the application of Section 90 IPC. Firstly, it must be shown that the consent was given under a misconception of fact. Secondly, it must be proved that the person who obtained the consent knew, or had reason to believe that the consent was [...] given in consequence of such misconception. [SCR p. 245]
In such circumstances the promise loses all significance, particularly when they are over come with emotions and passion and find themselves in situations and circumstances where they, in a weak moment, succumb to the temptation of having sexual relationship. [SCR p. 245]

Result

In the result, this appeal must succeed, and is accordingly allowed. The impugned judgment and order convicting and sentencing the appellant for the [...] offence punishable under Section [...] IPC is set aside, and the appellant stands acquitted of the charge. [SCR p. 246]

Editorial note: subsequent treatment

Followed in Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana (2013), which applies it, and in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (2019), which quotes its two-condition passage. Deelip Singh @ Dilip Kumar v. State of Bihar, quoted in Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2023), read Uday as not laying down that a promise to marry can never amount to a misconception of fact.

The headnote consists of extracts from the Court's judgment, selected by The Daily Bench for convenience. The selection is not part of the judgment, is not a law report and should not be cited. It may contain errors; rely on the official judgment. Library reference TDB-LL BNS-69/01 is our own cataloguing label and is not a citation.