Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra

[2019] 11 SCR 423

Court: Supreme Court of India (Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction)
Case: Criminal Appeal No. 1165 of 2019 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2712 of 2019)
Decided: 21 August 2019
Bench: Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, Indira Banerjee (judgment by Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, J.)
Citation: [2019] 11 SCR 423
Provisions: Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 375 (Secondly: without her consent), s. 90 and s. 376 (now Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, s. 63(ii), s. 28(a) and s. 64; BNS s. 69 covers the promise-to-marry case that does not amount to rape)
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, s. 482 (inherent powers; quashing of FIR); now Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, s. 528 (owner-supplied equivalence)

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Headnote

Sensitive matter. Sexual-offence matter: an FIR alleging rape on a promise of marriage (IPC s. 375 and 376). The complainant is not named in this file or in any extract; the text refers to her only as the complainant. The judgment also decides SC/ST Act allegations, which are not extracted here.

Rape and consent · IPC s. 375 Secondly (BNS s. 63(ii)) · IPC s. 90 misconception of fact (BNS s. 28(a)) · False promise of marriage · Breach of promise distinguished from false promise · Quashing of FIR under CrPC s. 482

The case, in the Court's words

The present proceedings concern an FIR registered against the appellant under Sections 376, 417, 504, and 506(2) of the IPC and Sections 3(1) (u), (w) and 3(2) (vii) of SC/ST Act. [para 9]

Held

This Court has repeatedly held that consent with respect to Section 375 of the IPC involves an active understanding of the circumstances, actions and consequences of the proposed act. An individual who makes a reasoned choice to act after evaluating various alternative actions (or inaction) as well as the various possible consequences flowing from such action or inaction, consents to such action. [para 12]
In the present case, the “misconception of fact” alleged by the complainant is the appellant’s promise to marry her. Specifically in the context of a promise to marry, this Court has observed that there is a distinction between a false promise given on the understanding by the maker that it will be broken, and the breach of a promise which is made in good faith but subsequently not fulfilled. [para 14]
To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, [...] given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman’s decision to engage in the sexual act. [para 18]
The allegations in the FIR do not on their face indicate that the promise by the appellant was false, [...] There is no allegation in the FIR that when the appellant promised to marry the complainant, it was done in bad faith or with the intention to deceive her. [para 20]

Result

For the above reasons, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgement and order of the High Court dated 7 February 2019. The FIR dated 17 May 2016 is quashed. [para 23]

Editorial note: subsequent treatment

Set out and applied in Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra (2024 INSC 897), which sets out paras 14, 16 and 18. Cited in Prashant v. State of NCT of Delhi (2024 INSC 879) and Jaspal Singh Kaural v. State of NCT of Delhi (2025 INSC 457).

The headnote consists of extracts from the Court's judgment, selected by The Daily Bench for convenience. The selection is not part of the judgment, is not a law report and should not be cited. It may contain errors; rely on the official judgment. Library reference TDB-LL BNS-69/03 is our own cataloguing label and is not a citation.