Pramod Kumar Navratna v. State of Chhattisgarh

2026 INSC 124

Court: Supreme Court of India (Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction)
Case: Criminal Appeal of 2026 (arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 4452 of 2025)
Decided: 5 February 2026
Bench: B.V. Nagarathna, Ujjal Bhuyan (judgment by B.V. Nagarathna, J.)
Citation: 2026 INSC 124
Provisions: Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 376(2)(n) (rape repeatedly on the same woman; the FIR and chargesheet); now Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, s. 64(2)(m)
Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 375 (rape; the clause Secondly consent point is discussed in paras 17 to 23); now Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, s. 63 (clause (ii), without her consent)
Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 90 (misconception of fact; quoted from Mahesh Damu Khare in para 23); now Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, s. 28(a)
Constitution of India, Article 226 (writ petition before the High Court seeking quashing of the FIR, paras 2 and 8)

Headnote

Sensitive matter. Sexual-offence matter: an FIR under IPC s. 376(2)(n) alleging rape on a false promise of marriage, quashed by this Court. The complainant was a married woman with divorce proceedings pending, which the Court treats as central (paras 19 and 24). The complainant is not named in this file or in any extract; she is referred to only as the complainant. The judgment also mentions a child, who is not named or extracted.

Rape on false promise of marriage · Complainant already married, divorce pending: promise of marriage not legally enforceable (Hindu Marriage Act s. 5(i)) · IPC s. 376(2)(n) (BNS s. 64(2)(m)) · IPC s. 375 clause Secondly (BNS s. 63) · IPC s. 90 misconception of fact (BNS s. 28(a)) · Consensual relationship turning acrimonious · Quashing of FIR and chargesheet · Non-reportable

The case, in the Court's words

On 06.02.2025, the complainant-respondent No.3 lodged an FIR No.213/2025 dated 06.02.2025 at Police Station Sarkanda at District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC against the accused-appellant alleging that he had raped her on a false promise of marriage. [para 5]

Held

It has been time and again settled by this Court, that the mere fact that the parties indulged in physical relations pursuant to a promise to marry will not amount to a rape in every case. An offence under Section 375 of the IPC could only be made out, if promise of marriage was made by the accused solely with a view to obtain consent for sexual relations without having any intent of [...] fulfilling said promise from the very beginning and that such false promise of marriage had a direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving her consent for sexual relations. [para 18]
The facts of the present case unmistakably indicate towards a classic case of a consensual relationship turning acrimonious. Upon perusal of the records of the case, it is evident that the complainant-respondent No.3 is a married lady with a ten years old child. The said marriage was solemnized on 02.06.2011 and although divorce proceedings are currently pending adjudication between her and her husband, by no stretch of imagination can it be held that the complainant-respondent No.3 was eligible for being married with the accused-appellant on 18.09.2022 [para 19]
such a promise would not be legally enforceable or even capable of being acted upon as the victim herself was not eligible for marriage, neither on the date of the first alleged act of offence i.e. 18.09.2022 nor on any subsequent dates wherein the parties indulged in the sexual activities, till the point of the date of registration of FIR i.e. 06.02.2025. The said embargo arises from sub-clause (i) of Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act,1955 which categorically prohibits marriage between two individuals if either of them have a living spouse. [para 19]
it is an admitted fact that the complainant-respondent No.3, within the first initial meetings told the accused-appellant that she was a married woman with divorce proceedings pending before the Family Court. Therefore, in the same breath, she cannot be allowed to claim and allege that she was also coaxed by the accused-appellant into having a physical relationship with him on the false pretext of marriage as the two facts cannot stand together on the same plane and simultaneously as both are antagonistic and antithetical to each other. [para 24]
Such genuine cases that deserve prosecution of the accused must be clearly demarcated from the litigation that arises from the cases of consensual relationships between consenting adults going acrimonious on account of dispute and disagreement or a future change of mind. [para 22]
In fact, we find that the allegation of rape on false pretext of marriage even when taken on its face value, does not amount to an offence of rape and hence not liable for punishment under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC in the instant case [para 27]

Result

In view of the aforesaid discussion and keeping the judicial dicta laid down by this Court in mind we set aside the impugned order dated 03.03.2025 of the High Court and consequently, FIR No.213/2025 dated 06.02.2025 registered with Sarkanda Police Station at district Bilaspur and the Chargesheet No.269/2025, and the consequent proceedings arising out of the said proceedings in Sessions Case No.89/2025 are quashed. The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms. [para 28]

Editorial note: subsequent treatment

The judgment is non-reportable and is not in the Reports. It relies on Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra (2024) 11 SCC 398, Prashant v. State of NCT of Delhi (2025) 5 SCC 764 and Samadhan v. State of Maharashtra (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2528), and applies State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Suppl (1) SCC 335) (paras 23 to 27). The prosecution was under IPC s. 376(2)(n).

The headnote consists of extracts from the Court's judgment, selected by The Daily Bench for convenience. The selection is not part of the judgment, is not a law report and should not be cited. It may contain errors; rely on the official judgment. Library reference TDB-LL BNS-69/06 is our own cataloguing label and is not a citation.