Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana

[2013] 6 SCR 544

Court: Supreme Court of India (Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction)
Case: Criminal Appeal No. 2322 of 2010
Decided: 20 May 2013
Bench: B.S. Chauhan, Dipak Misra (judgment by B.S. Chauhan, J.)
Citation: [2013] 6 SCR 544
Provisions: IPC s. 375 (rape; Secondly: without her consent) = BNS s. 63(ii)
IPC s. 90 (consent given under fear or misconception) = BNS s. 28(a)
BNS s. 69 (sexual intercourse by deceitful means or by a promise to marry without any intention of fulfilling it, not amounting to rape; up to 10 years and fine; no IPC equivalent)
IPC s. 365 (kidnapping or abducting with intent secretly and wrongfully to confine)

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Headnote

Sensitive matter. Sexual-offence matter (rape alleged under IPC s. 376, now BNS s. 63). The complainant is not named in this file or in any extract.

Rape · Consent obtained on a false promise of marriage · Breach of promise distinguished from false promise · IPC s. 90 (consent under misconception of fact) · BNS s. 69

Held

This Court considered the issue involved herein at [...] length in the case of [...] and came to the conclusion that in the event that the accused's promise is not false and has not been made [...] with the sole intention to seduce the prosecutrix to indulge in sexual acts, such an act(s) would not amount to rape. [para 16]
Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. [...] There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, [...] and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. [para 18]
[...] where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. [para 18]
Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time, i.e. at initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. [...] Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her. [para 21]

Result

Therefore, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. His conviction and sentences awarded by the courts below are set aside. [para 25]

Editorial note: subsequent treatment

Paragraphs 18 and 21 are quoted and relied on in later Supreme Court judgments, including Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (2019), Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2023) and Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra (2024).

The headnote consists of extracts from the Court's judgment, selected by The Daily Bench for convenience. The selection is not part of the judgment, is not a law report and should not be cited. It may contain errors; rely on the official judgment. Library reference TDB-LL BNS-69/02 is our own cataloguing label and is not a citation.