Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar

1985 SCR (3) 191 · AIR 1985 SC 628 · (1985) 2 SCC 370

Court: Supreme Court of India (Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction)
Case: Criminal Appeal No. 684 of 1982
Decided: 12 March 1985
Bench: Syed Murtaza Fazal Ali, Sabyasachi Mukharji, A. Varadarajan (judgment by Fazal Ali, J. (for himself and Sabyasachi Mukharji, J.); A. Varadarajan, J. dissented)
Citation: 1985 SCR (3) 191
Equivalent citations: AIR 1985 SC 628; (1985) 2 SCC 370 (as printed in the judgment)
Provisions: Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 405 and s. 406 (now Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, s. 316(1) and s. 316(2))
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, s. 482 (inherent powers of the High Court)

Headnote

Criminal breach of trust · IPC s. 405 and s. 406 (BNS s. 316(1), 316(2)) · Entrustment · Stridhan · Civil and criminal remedy together · Quashing of complaint (CrPC s. 482)

Held

To this extent, therefore, we overrule this decision and hold that with regard to the stridhan property of a married woman, even if it is placed in the custody of her husband or in-laws they would be deemed to be trustees and bound to return the same if and when demanded by her. The Supreme Court in a large number of cases has held that the fundamental core of the offence of criminal breach of trust. is that a property must be entrusted and the dominion of the property should be given to the trustee. [SCR p. 217]
In order to establish " entrustment of dominion" over property to an accused person the mere existence of that person's dominion over property is not enough. It must be further shown that his dominion was the result of entrustment. Therefore, as rightly pointed out by Harris, C.J. the prosecution must establish that dominion over the assets or a particular asset of the partnership was by a special agreement between the parties, entrusted to the accused person. [SCR p. 219]
The expression 'entrustment' carries with it the implication that the person handing over any property or on whose behalf that property is handed over to another, continues to be its owner. Further the person handing over the property must have confidence in the person taking the property so as to create a fiduciary relationship between them. [SCR p. 219]
Furthermore, the High Court has gravely erred in holding that the property could only be claimed by filing a properly constituted civil suit or in accordance with the provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act or the Hindu Marriage Act as the case may be. This proposition, in our opinion, is wholly incorrect [SCR p. 221]
It is well settled by a long course of this Court that for the purpose of exercising its power under s. 482 Cr.P.C. to quash a FIR or a complaint the High Court would have to proceed entirely on the basis of the allegations made in the complaint or the documents accompanying the same per se. It has no jurisdiction to examine the correctness or otherwise of the allegations. In case no offence is committed on the allegation and the ingredients of s.405 & 406, I.P.C. are not made out, the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceedings. [SCR p. 223]

Result

We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore the complaint filed by the appellant and direct that the accused may be summoned, if not already summoned, and put on trial in accordance with law. [SCR p. 225]

Editorial note: subsequent treatment

Editorial note: decided by a majority of 2 to 1 (Varadarajan J. dissented). In Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada (1996) a Bench of three Judges, on a reference, expressed respectful agreement with the majority view and held that it needed no reconsideration; the case is also discussed in Krishna Bhatacharjee v. Sarathi Choudhury (2015) and Maya Gopinathan v. Anoop S.B. (2024).

The headnote consists of extracts from the Court's judgment, selected by The Daily Bench for convenience. The selection is not part of the judgment, is not a law report and should not be cited. It may contain errors; rely on the official judgment. Library reference TDB-LL BNS-316/03 is our own cataloguing label and is not a citation.