Section 100 defines culpable homicide (old IPC s. 299); section 105 prescribes the punishment (old IPC s. 304, Parts I and II).
Pulicherla Nagaraju @ Nagaraja Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh
- Case
- Criminal Appeal No. 945 of 2004
- Bench
- G.P. Mathur, R.V. Raveendran (judgment by R.V. Raveendran, J.)
- Provisions
- Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 299, s. 300 and s. 304 Part I and Part II (now Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, s. 100, s. 101 and s. 105)
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Headnote
Culpable homicide not amounting to murder · IPC s. 304 Part I and Part II (BNS s. 105) · Murder or culpable homicide: factors to infer intention · Exception 4 to IPC s. 300 (BNS s. 101) · Single blow
The case, in the Court's words
The third contention relates to the question whether the offence is a murder punishable under Section 302, or culpable homicide not amounting to murder, punishable under Section 304 Part II. [para 13]
Held
- We cannot accept the contention that whenever the death is on account of a single blow, the offence is one under Section 304 and not Section 302. [para 16]
- It would thus be seen that in all these cases, the accused landing a single blow was only one of the several circumstances which persuaded this Court to hold that the offence did not fall under Section 302 but fell under Section 304 Part I or Part II. The fact that the accused gave only one blow, by itself, would not mitigate the offence to one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. [para 17]
- Therefore, the court should proceed to decide the pivotal question of intention, with care and caution, as that will decide whether the case falls under Section 302 or 304 Part I or 304 Part II. [...] It is for the courts to ensure that the cases of murder punishable under section 302, are not converted into offences punishable under section 304 Part I/II, or cases of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, are treated as murder punishable under section 302. [para 18]
- The intention to cause death can be gathered generally from a combination of a few or several of the following, among other, circumstances : (i) nature of the weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon was carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body; (iv) the amount of force employed in causing injury; (v) whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for all fight; (vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or whether there was any pre-meditation; (vii) whether there was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was a stranger; (viii) whether there was any grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such provocation; (ix) whether it was in the heat of passion; (x) whether the person inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual manner; (xi) whether the accused dealt a single blow or several blows. The above list of circumstances is, of course, not exhaustive and there may be several other special circumstances with reference to individual cases which may throw light on the question of intention. [para 18]
- The intention to cause death or at all events intention of causing bodily injury which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death was made out. The circumstances to bring the case under Exception (4) to Section 300 do not exist. [para 19]
Result
We accordingly find no reason to interfere with the decision of the High Court convicting the appellant. The appeal is dismissed. [para 20]
Editorial note: subsequent treatment
The factors listed in para 18 are quoted or applied in later Supreme Court judgments, including Stalin v. State (2020), State of Uttarakhand v. Sachendra Singh Rawat (2022), Anbazhagan v. State (2023), N. Ramkumar v. State (2023), Joy Devaraj v. State of Kerala (2024) and Om Pal v. State of U.P. (2025). Note: the official copy numbers this passage para 18; reports that print it as para 29 follow the report's own numbering.
Rampal Singh v. State of U.P.
- Case
- Criminal Appeal No. 2114 of 2009
- Bench
- Swatanter Kumar, Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla (judgment by Swatanter Kumar, J.)
- Provisions
- Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 299, s. 300 and s. 304 Part I and Part II (now Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, s. 100, s. 101 and s. 105)
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Headnote
Culpable homicide not amounting to murder · IPC s. 304 Part I and Part II (BNS s. 105) · Distinction between the two Parts of s. 304 · Principle of exclusion · Grave and sudden provocation
The case, in the Court's words
The present appeal is directed against the judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dated 15th May, 2007. Vide the impugned judgment, the High Court affirmed the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the VIII Additional Sessions Judge, Mainpuri awarding life imprisonment to the appellant Rampal Singh for an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [para 1]
Held
- Thus, where the act committed is done with the clear intention to kill the other person, it will be a murder within the meaning of Section 300 of the Code and punishable under Section 302 of the Code but where the act is done on grave and sudden provocation which is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender himself, the offence would fall under the exceptions to Section 300 of the Code and is punishable under Section 304 of the Code. [para 20]
- There are two apparent distinctions, one in relation to the punishment while other is founded on the intention of causing that act, without any intention but with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. It is neither advisable nor possible to state any straight-jacket formula that would be universally applicable to all cases for such determination. Every case essentially must be decided on its own merits. [para 21]
- As we have already discussed, classification of an offence into either Part of Section 304 is primarily a matter of fact. This would have to be decided with reference to the nature of the offence, intention of the offender, weapon used, the place and nature of the injuries, existence of pre-meditated mind, the persons participating [...] in the commission of the crime and to some extent the motive for commission of the crime. The evidence led by the parties with reference to all these circumstances greatly helps the court in coming to a final conclusion as to under which penal provision of the Code the accused is liable to be punished. [para 23]
- This can also be decided from another point of view, i.e., by applying the ‘principle of exclusion’. This principle could be applied while taking recourse to a two-stage process of determination. Firstly, the Court may record a preliminary finding if the accused had committed an offence punishable under the substantive provisions of Section 302 of the Code, that is, ‘culpable homicide amounting to murder’. Then secondly, it may proceed to examine if the case fell in any of the exceptions detailed in Section 300 of the Code. [para 23]
- Thus, the present is not a case of knowledge simplicitor but that of intention ex facie. In the case of Aradadi Ramudu @ Aggiramudu vs. State, through Inspector of Police [(2012) 5 SCC 134], this Court also took the view that for modification of sentence from Section 302 of the Code to Part II of Section 304 of the Code, not only should there be an absence of the intention to cause death but also an absence of intention to cause such bodily injury that in the ordinary course of things is likely to cause death. [para 30]
Result
In view of the above discussion, we partially accept this appeal and alter the offence that the appellant has been held guilty of, from that under Section 302 of the Code to the one under Section 304 Part I of the Code. [para 31]
Editorial note: subsequent treatment
Cited by later Supreme Court judgments for the genus-and-species relation of culpable homicide and murder, including Anbazhagan v. State (2023) and N. Ramkumar v. State (2023). The punishment ranges quoted in para 19 are those of the IPC and differ from BNS s. 105.
Chenda @ Chanda Ram v. State of Chhattisgarh
- Case
- Criminal Appeal No. 1285 of 2013 [arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 3028 of 2012]
- Bench
- Chandramauli Kr. Prasad, Kurian Joseph (judgment by Kurian Joseph, J.)
- Provisions
- Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 299, s. 300 and s. 304 Part I and Part II (now Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, s. 100, s. 101 and s. 105); Exception 4 to s. 300 (now BNS s. 101, Exception 4)
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Headnote
Culpable homicide not amounting to murder · IPC s. 304 Part II (BNS s. 105) · Exception 4 to IPC s. 300: sudden fight · Single blow · Part I or Part II after Exception 4
The case, in the Court's words
The crucial aspect to be analysed in this case is whether the conduct of the appellant in inflicting the fatal blow is intentional and with knowledge or with knowledge only. [para 7]
Held
- If the case falls under Exception 4, then the further inquiry should be as to whether the case falls under the first part of Section 304 or the second part [para 8]
- It was held that the said Exception can be invoked if death is caused (i) without premeditation; (ii) in a sudden fight; (iii) without the offender’s having taken undue advantage or acting in a cruel or unusual manner; and (iv) the fight must have been with the person killed. It was further held that all the four ingredients must be found in order to apply Exception 4. [para 13]
- It cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever one blow is given, Section 302 IPC is ruled out. It would depend upon the weapon used, the size of it in some cases, force with which the blow was given, part of the body on which it was given and several such relevant factors. [paras 13-14]
- When and if there is intent and knowledge, then the same would be a case of Section 304 Part I and if it is only a case of knowledge and not the intention to cause murder and bodily injury, then the same would be a case of Section 304 Part II. [para 14]
- It is not required that the fight must be between the main accused and deceased. The fight can as well be between two parties, the deceased on one side and all the other accused on the other side. [para 16]
- The next inquiry is whether the offence falls under first part of Section 304 or the second part. Having regard to the parameters indicated in Gurmukh Singh’s case (supra), the offence seems to fall under the second part. There is no evidence of motive or previous enmity. The incident has taken place on the spur of the moment. There is no evidence regarding the intention behind the fatal consequence of the blow. There was only one blow. [para 17]
Result
Thus, considering all these aspects, we are of the view that it is a fit case to alter the punishment of imprisonment for life to imprisonment for a period of 10 years with fine of Rs.50,000/-. Ordered accordingly. [para 17]
Editorial note: subsequent treatment
Applies Exception 4 to s. 300 as stated in Pappu v. State of M.P. (2006) and the sentencing factors in Gurmukh Singh v. State of Haryana (2009), and follows State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu Punnayya (1976).
Stalin v. State represented by the Inspector of Police
- Case
- Criminal Appeal No. 577 of 2020 [arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 3171 of 2019]
- Bench
- Ashok Bhushan, R. Subhash Reddy, M.R. Shah (judgment by M.R. Shah, J.)
- Provisions
- Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 299, s. 300 and s. 304 Part I and Part II (now Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, s. 100, s. 101 and s. 105); Exception 4 to s. 300 (now BNS s. 101, Exception 4)
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Headnote
Murder or culpable homicide · IPC s. 304 Part I (BNS s. 105) · Single injury · Exception 4 to IPC s. 300: sudden fight · Conviction altered from s. 302
The case, in the Court's words
At the outset, it is required to be noted that vide order dated 01.04.2019, this Court has issued a notice in the present appeal limited to the extent as to whether the conviction ought to have been under Section 304 Part II or Section 302 IPC. [para 3]
Held
- The nature of injury, the part of the body where it is caused, the weapon used in causing such injury are the indicators of the fact whether the accused caused the death of the deceased with an intention of causing death or not. It cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever the death occurs on account of a single blow, Section 302 IPC is ruled out. The fact situation has to be considered in each case, more particularly, under the circumstances narrated hereinabove, the events which precede will also have a bearing on the issue whether the act by which the death was caused was done with an intention of causing death or knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without intention to cause death. It is the totality of the circumstances which will decide the nature of offence. [para 7.2]
- As per Exception IV to Section 300 IPC, culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue advantage and not having acted in a cruel or unusual manner. In the present case, at the place of incident the beer was being served; all of them who participated in the beer party were friends; the starting of the incident is narrated by P.W.3, as stated hereinabove. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances, culpable homicide cannot be said to be a murder within the definition of Section 300 IPC and, therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case narrated hereinabove and the manner in which the incident started in a beer party, we are of the opinion that Section 302 IPC shall not be attracted. [para 10]
- Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case and more particularly that the accused inflicted the blow with a weapon like knife and he inflicted the injury on the deceased on the vital part of the body, it is to be presumed that causing such bodily [...] injury was likely to cause the death. Therefore, the case would fall under Section 304 Part I of the IPC and not under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. [para 11]
Result
The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court confirming the conviction of the accused for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC is hereby modified from that of under Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part I IPC. The accused is held guilty for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part I IPC and sentenced to undergo 8 years R.I. with a fine of Rs.10,000/ and, in default, to further undergo one year R.I. [para 12]
Editorial note: subsequent treatment
The passage in para 7.2 on single-injury cases is cited in later Supreme Court judgments, including State of Uttarakhand v. Sachendra Singh Rawat (2022) and Joy Devaraj v. State of Kerala (2024).
Anbazhagan v. State represented by the Inspector of Police
- Case
- Criminal Appeal No. 2043 of 2023 [arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 9289 of 2019]
- Bench
- B.R. Gavai, J.B. Pardiwala (judgment by J.B. Pardiwala, J.)
- Provisions
- Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 299, s. 300 and s. 304 Part I and Part II (now Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, s. 100, s. 101 and s. 105); clause thirdly of s. 300 (now BNS s. 101(c))
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Headnote
Culpable homicide not amounting to murder · IPC s. 304 Part I and Part II (BNS s. 105) · Intention and knowledge · IPC s. 300 thirdly (BNS s. 101(c)) · Conviction altered from Part I to Part II
The case, in the Court's words
the only question that falls for our consideration is whether the conviction of the appellant herein for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part I of the IPC should be further altered to Section 304 Part II of the IPC. [para 17]
Held
- Intention, which is a state of mind, can never be precisely proved by direct evidence as a fact; it can only be deduced or inferred from other facts which are proved. The intention may be proved by res gestae, by acts or events previous or subsequent to the incident or occurrence, on admission. Intention of a person cannot be proved by direct evidence but is to be deduced from the facts and circumstances of a case. There are various relevant circumstances from which the intention can be gathered. [para 21]
- The difference between clause (b) of Section 299 of the IPC and clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC is one of the degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. To put it more broadly, it is the degree of probability of death which determines whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree. [para 39]
- We say so because there is fine difference between the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC. Under the first part, the crime of murder is first established and the accused is then given the benefit of one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second part, the crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore, for the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not bring his case within one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. [para 46]
- (3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person falls within the first two clauses of cases of culpable homicide as described in Section 299 of the IPC it is punishable under the first part of Section 304. If, however, it falls within the third clause, it is punishable under the second part of Section 304. In effect, therefore, the first part of this section would apply when there is ‘guilty intention,’ whereas the second part would apply when there is no such intention, but there is ‘guilty knowledge’. [para 60]
- To put it more succinctly, the difference between the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that under the first part, the crime of murder is first established and the accused is then given the benefit of one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second part, the crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore, for the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not bring his case within one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. [para 60]
- (12) In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient [...] in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the offence would be one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. [para 60]
Result
In the aforesaid view of the matter and more particularly bearing the principles of law explained aforesaid, the present appeal is partly allowed. The conviction of the appellant under [...] Section 304 Part I of the IPC is altered to one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. For the altered conviction, the appellant is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years. [para 63]
Editorial note: subsequent treatment
Para 46 notes that observations in Jagrup Singh v. State of Haryana (1981) and other decisions, which took recourse to Exception 4 to alter a conviction from s. 302 to s. 304 Part II, create some confusion; it does not overrule that judgment. Referred to as a recent judgment in N. Ramkumar v. State (2023).
Headnotes are extracts from the Court's own judgments, selected by The Daily Bench for convenience. The selection is not part of the judgments, is not a law report and should not be cited. Rely on the official judgment.