Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab

1983 (1) SCR 145 · 1982 AIR 1325 · 1982 SCC (3) 24

Court: Supreme Court of India (Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction)
Case: Criminal Appeal No. 273 of 1979, with Writ Petitions Nos. 564, 165, 179, 168, 434, 89, 754, 756 and 976 of 1979 and Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 1732 of 1979
Decided: 9 May 1980
Bench: Y.V. Chandrachud, A.C. Gupta, N.L. Untwalia, R.S. Sarkaria, P.N. Bhagwati (judgment by Sarkaria, J. (for himself, Chandrachud CJ, A.C. Gupta and N.L. Untwalia JJ.; Bhagwati J. dissenting))
Citation: 1983 (1) SCR 145
Equivalent citations: 1982 AIR 1325; 1982 SCC (3) 24 (as printed in the judgment)
Provisions: Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 302 (now Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, s. 103(1))
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, s. 354(3) (now Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, s. 393(3), owner-supplied equivalence) and s. 235(2)

Headnote

Murder · Death sentence · IPC s. 302 (BNS s. 103(1)) · CrPC s. 354(3) special reasons · Rarest of rare · Mitigating and aggravating circumstances

Held

The expression "special reasons" in the context of this provision, obviously means "exceptional reasons" founded on the exceptionally grave circumstances of the particular case relating to the crime as well as the criminal. Thus, the legislative policy now writ large and clear on the face of Section 354(3) is that on conviction for murder and other capital offences punishable in the alternative with death under the Penal Code, the extreme penalty should be imposed only in extreme cases. [SCR p. 236]
The only effect is that the application of those principles is now to be guided by the paramount beacons of legislative policy discernible from Sections 354 (3) and 235 (2), namely: (1) The extreme penalty can be inflicted only in gravest cases of extreme culpability; [SCR p. 250]
That is why, it is not desirable to consider the circumstances of the crime and the circumstances of the criminal in two separate water-tight compartments. In a sense, to kill is to be cruel and, therefore, all murders are cruel. But such cruelty may vary in its degree of culpability. And it is only when the culpability assumes the proportion of extreme depravity that "special reasons" can legitimately be said to exist. [SCR p. 252]
No exhaustive enumeration of aggravating circumstances is possible. But this much can be said that in order to qualify for inclusion in the category of [...] circumstances found on the facts of a particular case, must evidence aggravation of an abnormal or special degree. [SCR p. 254]
Nonetheless, it cannot be overemphasised that the scope and concept of mitigating factors in the area of death penalty must receive a liberal and expansive construction by the courts in accord with the sentencing policy writ large in Section 354(3). [SCR p. 255]
That ought not to be done save in the rarest of rare cases when the alternative option is unquestionably foreclosed. [SCR p. 256]

Result

For all the foregoing reasons, we reject the challenge to the constitutionality of the impugned provisions contained in Sections 302, Penal Code, and 354(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The writ petitions and the connected petitions can now be heard and disposed of, on their individual merits, in the light of the broad guidelines and principles enunciated in this judgment. [SCR p. 256]

Editorial note: subsequent treatment

The majority judgment (Sarkaria J.) was pronounced on 9 May 1980; the official PDF header prints 16-08-1982, the date of Bhagwati J.'s separate dissenting reasons, which are bound in the same report. In Chhannu Lal Verma v. State of Chhattisgarh (28-11-2018), para 19, a three-judge bench held that this Constitution Bench decision binds courts until it is duly revisited, while noting concern about inconsistent application. On 19-09-2022, in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 1 of 2022, a three-judge bench referred to a five-judge bench the question of the separate hearing on sentence under s. 235(2) CrPC; the reference does not doubt the 'rarest of rare' test, and is yet to be decided.

The headnote consists of extracts from the Court's judgment, selected by The Daily Bench for convenience. The selection is not part of the judgment, is not a law report and should not be cited. It may contain errors; rely on the official judgment. Library reference TDB-LL BNS-103/03 is our own cataloguing label and is not a citation.