Karnataka HC lays down procedure for a Magistrate who receives a police ‘B’ report in a private complaint; summons quashed

Court: High Court of Karnataka
Date of judgment: 1 October 2026
Case: CRL.P/2397/2020
Parties: AMIT BANSAL Vs STATE OF KARNATAKA
Bench: H.P.SANDESH
Outcome: Allowed

Summary

The Karnataka High Court has quashed a Magistrate's orders rejecting a police ‘B’ report and issuing process against the petitioner, accused No. 4, in a private complaint alleging that software was copied and cheating committed, and has set out the procedure a Magistrate should follow when a ‘B’ report is filed after a reference under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. Justice H.P. Sandesh held that, without arraigning the company, there could be no criminal prosecution of the petitioner, who was described as its Managing Director. He also found that the Magistrate had rejected the ‘B’ report and issued summons without considering the protest memo, the sworn statements and the documents together. The Registrar General was directed to send the order to all Magistrates and Judges dealing with private complaints and to the Director of the Karnataka Judicial Academy.

The complainant, owner of a company, alleged that it had developed and patented a software called Kaleido and, in 2014, gave it on trial to the Pearson company, which copied and marketed it. On a complaint dated 30 May 2015, police registered Crime No. 176/2015 under Section 420 IPC and, on a requisition to the Magistrate, added Sections 380, 406, 468, 471 and 120B IPC and Section 65 of the Information Technology Act, 2000, then filed a ‘B’ report. The complainant filed a protest petition and her sworn statement was recorded on 17 December 2016. By an order of 8 July 2019 the IV Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru, rejected the ‘B’ report and took cognizance. After a further sworn statement, an order of 21 December 2019 again took cognizance and directed summons to the accused. The petition, filed under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., sought to quash the order rejecting the ‘B’ report, the order taking cognizance and issuing summons, and the case itself.

The question before the court

Can the petitioner be prosecuted as Managing Director when the company has not been arraigned as an accused?
Did the Magistrate err in rejecting the ‘B’ report without looking into the protest memo and without concluding that the police had committed an error in filing it?
Did the Magistrate err in issuing summons without considering the protest memo, the sworn statement and the documents together?
What procedure should a Magistrate follow when a ‘B’ report is filed on a reference under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and the complainant files a protest memo?

What each side argued

The petitioner argued that the complaint, protest petition and sworn statement attributed no role to him, that the company was not arraigned, and that the allegations were civil in nature, as shown by the civil suit O.S. No. 4899/2015.
He relied on Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours (P) Ltd. to argue that without the company as an accused there can be no prosecution of those who are vicariously liable, and on Pepsi Foods to argue that summoning must show application of mind.
He also argued that the Magistrate did not follow the procedure laid down in Dr. Ravikumar v. K.M.C. Vasantha for rejecting a ‘B’ report, and that the IT Act, being a special law, governed the alleged offences.
The complainant argued that arraigning the company is not an absolute rule, that specific allegations were made against the petitioner in paragraph 6 of the complaint, that conspiracy under Section 120B IPC was alleged and was a matter for trial, and that the Magistrate had followed the procedure in Dr. Ravikumar.

The court's decision

On the first point, the Court accepted the settled position in Aneeta Hada that commission of the offence by the company is a condition for vicarious liability of others, and rejected the complainant's contention that arraigning the company is not essential. The allegations were directed against the Pearson company, which had not been made an accused, so there could be no prosecution of its employees and the petitioner as Managing Director.

On the Magistrate's orders, the Court found that the 8 July 2019 order rejected the ‘B’ report without discussing the sworn statement or the document marked Ex.C.1, and without concluding that the Investigating Officer had erred. The Magistrate then recorded a further sworn statement, extracted the same contents of the earlier order in its order of 21 December 2019 and again took cognizance, without discussing Ex.C.2. The Court held that recording the sworn statement is itself taking cognizance, so cognizance had been taken twice. It called the double recording of sworn statements an error that does not vitiate the proceedings.

Relying on H.S. Bains, Rakesh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Zunaid v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Shivshankar Singh and G. Krishna Prakash, the Court summarised the procedure. A reference under Section 156(3) is a pre-cognizance order. Recording the complainant's sworn statement amounts to taking cognizance, whether or not it is stated. Where notice of the ‘B’ report is given to the complainant, whether by the Investigating Officer or by the Court, and a protest memo is filed, even if not detailed, it is to be treated as a complaint, with a chance to file a full one. The Magistrate need not reject the ‘B’ report at that stage. The IO's reasons, the sworn statement and the documents are to be considered together, and the Magistrate then either issues process under Section 204 or dismisses the complaint under Section 203, without necessarily passing an order accepting or rejecting the ‘B’ report.

Because the company had not been arraigned, the Court held that the order of the Trial Court in respect of the petitioner, accused No. 4, could not stand and that there was no need to remand the matter. The petition was allowed and that order quashed. The Registrar General was directed to communicate the order to all Magistrates and Judges dealing with private complaints, and to the Director of the Karnataka Judicial Academy for judicial officers' training.

Precedents referred to

H.S. Bains v. State (Union Territory of Chandigarh) (1980) 4 SCC 631
Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours (P) Ltd. (2012) 5 SCC 661
Rakesh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2014) 13 SCC 133
Zunaid v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2023) 14 SCC 576
Shivshankar Singh v. State of Bihar (2012) 1 SCC 130
Shivjee Singh v. Nagendra Tiwary (2010) 7 SCC 578
G. Krishna Prakash v. State of Karnataka ILR 2008 KAR 3569
Dr. Ravikumar v. K.M.C. Vasantha (Crl.P. No. 536/2017)

Provisions referred to

Code of Criminal Procedure (Sections 156(3), 190, 200, 202, 203, 204 and 482)
Indian Penal Code (Sections 380, 406, 420, 468, 471 and 120B)
Information Technology Act, 2000 (Section 65)

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Official source: High Court of Karnataka. The PDF above is a copy from an open dataset of the court's public records.

This summary is prepared for general assistance only. It may contain errors and is not legal advice — rely on the full judgment.

Criminal Procedure Private Complaint B Report Magistrate Quashing

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